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NOTES
THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008:
THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK
INTRODUCTION
In September 1987, Francis J. Kelly, the senior buyer in Drexel
University's purchasing department, fractured his hip, leaving him
with a noticeable limp.' Kelly's physician diagnosed him with severe
post-traumatic degenerative joint disease2 and protrusio acetabulum, 3
both of which caused Kelly "great difficulty in walking around."4
Drexel later eliminated Kelly's position at the university.5 Kelly,
sixty-eight years old at the time, filed charges of discrimination
against Drexel under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
summary judgment in favor of Drexel, finding that Kelly did not
qualify as disabled under the protections enumerated by the ADA.
Although the Third Circuit found that Kelly's condition forced him to
move slowly and take great care when maneuvering up and down
stairs, it nonetheless held that Kelly's impairment did not
I Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1996).
2 Degenerative joint disease, or osteoarthritis, causes articular cartilage to grow soft or
frayed as a result of trauma, leading to "pain and loss of function." Osteoarthritis most
commonly affects "weight-bearing joints, [and] is more common in old people." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1388 (28th ed. 2006) (1911).
3 The National Institutes of Health describes protrusio acetabulum as "a hip joint
deformity in which the medial wall of the acetabulum invades into the pelvic cavity . . . ."
Samuel Van de Velde, Ramona Fillman & Suzanne Yandow, The Aetiology of Protrusio
Acetabuli: Literature Review from 1824 to 2006, 72 ACTA ORTHOPAEDICA BELGICA 524, 524
(2006).
Kelly, 94 F.3d at 106.
5 Id. at 104.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). Kelly also brought suit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000), and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act, 43 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963 (2008). See Kelly, 94 F.3d at 104.
7 Kelly, 94 F.3d at 109 ("Overall, we are satisfied that Kelly is not disabled within ADA.
Thus, the district court properly granted Drexel summary judgment on that claim.").
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"substantially limit" his ability to walk because he did not require a
cane or other assistance in order to move around. Kelly's physical
impairment, though limiting, apparently did not reach the threshold
required for ADA protection.9
In 1986, Abigail Guzmdn-Rosario began part-time work for United
Parcel Service, scanning and repositioning packages as they moved
along a conveyor belt.' 0 In November 1997, Guzmin-Rosario noticed
severe pain in her side and spent a few days in the hospital
undergoing tests." Ultimately, Guzmin-Rosario was diagnosed with
ovarian cysts, which had to be surgically removed.12 Despite
successful removal, Guzmin-Rosario continued to suffer from
intermittent nausea and pain.13 At times, her symptoms were so severe
that she had to miss work and spend the day at home lying down.14
Despite medical documentation of her condition, UPS grew impatient
with Guzmin-Rosario's absences,15 and the company terminated her
employment.16 In rejecting Guzmin-Rosario's claims, the First
Circuit found that the ADA did not reach those with temporary
afflictions and thus could not protect Guzmin-Rosario.17
These cases illustrate the courts' general reluctance to find
plaintiffs disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The stated
purpose of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." 8 Unfortunately, the statute's definition
of disability,' in its original manifestation, provided little guidance to
courts, and its application has failed to achieve the Act's stated goal.
The ADA defines a disability as: "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
8 Id. at 106 ("The district court held 'as a matter of law that [Kelly's] trouble climbing
stairs . . . does not substantially limit his ability to walk.' We will affirm the district court's
holding in this regard." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
9 For ADA protection under both the 1990 and 2009 standards, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that his impairment "substantially limits one or more major life activities." 42
U.S.C. § 12102(l)(A) (2006) (emphasis added); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (preserving the original statutory language).
10 Guzmin-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2005).
1 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 UPS argued that it had lawful reasons for terminating Guzmlin-Rosario, including
alleged "theft of time," due to Guzmin-Rosario's telephone use. Id. at 8-9. An arbitrator later
found that the termination was unjustified on those grounds. Id. at 9.
16 Id. at 8-9.
17 See id at 10 ("[The ADA is not a medical leave act nor a requirement of
accommodation for common conditions that are short-term or can be promptly remedied.").
Is 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006).
19 Id. § 12102(2).
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activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 20 As interpreted,
however, "a surprising number of people who one might assume
would benefit from the ADA are left outside its protections,"21
typically because of the courts' strict construction of the statute's
vague definitional boundaries.22 Frequently, disabled individuals like
Kelly or Guzmin-Rosario find their lawsuits dismissed "because their
impairments are not considered limiting enough to qualify as
disabilities" under the ADA.23
In several respects, courts' interpretational difficulties stem from
the original ADA's ambiguous language. 24 The judiciary has had
trouble deciphering how broadly or narrowly to construe "major life
activity," despite administrative guidance from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").25 Further, the
courts have created a paradox in interpreting the substantially limits
prong of the ADA, often finding plaintiffs at once too disabled and
not disabled enough.26 As a result, the courts' strict approach to the
ADA's definitional boundaries has created serious impediments to
meritorious disability cases.27
Although the ADA was originally passed in 1990, by 1996 the
judicial climate had already chilled to ADA claims. Courts had
"summarily dismissed numerous cases of alleged disability
discrimination on the ground that the plaintiffs were not disabled,
20 Id.
21 Michelle T. Friedland, Note, Not Disabled Enough: The ADA's "Major Life Activity"
Definition ofDisability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 171, 171-72 (1999).
22 See id at 172; see also, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that an employee with breast cancer was not substantially limited in the
major life activity of working).
23 Friedland, supra note 21, at 172 (emphasis added).
24 See, e.g., Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under
the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 370 (2000) (noting that the Supreme
Court's rulings in several ADA cases have "seriously undermine[d] the purposes and goals of
the ADA . . . and permit[ted] covered entities to discriminate at will against persons whom
Congress clearly intended to be protected under the Act").
25 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2009) ("Major Life Activities means functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working.").
26 See Tucker, supra note 24, at 333 (noting that the Supreme Court has allowed
defendants to treat plaintiffs as "too disabled for the job, but not sufficiently disabled to warrant
protection under the ADA"); see also Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999)
(finding that monocular vision was a disability insufficient to meet the requirements of a
protected disability, but sufficient to impair plaintiffs ability to work, and thus permitted the
employer to discharge the plaintiff).
27 See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1434 (1999) (noting that "cases decided under the ADA have found diseases as
serious as hemophilia, diabetes, and cancer not to satisfy the statutory elements of a disability").
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even though the plaintiffs bringing these cases suffered from
disorders as severe as cancer and hemophilia."28 The trend continued
into the second decade of ADA interpretation. A recent survey found
that of 272 ADA claims in 2006, employers won in 97.2% of the
cases, while employees won only 2.8%.29
Recognizing that the ADA inadequately protected the disabled,
Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"),3 0
which President George W. Bush signed into law on Thursday,
September 25, 2008.31 The ADAAA took effect on January 1, 2009,
and creates several expanded protections that likely would have
provided relief to both Francis Kelly and Abigail Guzmin-Rosario. 32
While disability advocates may initially embrace these changes, some
concern exists that the amendments sweep too broadly.33 Three
amended sections pose the most significant threat to protection
consistent with the legislative intent of the ADA. First, the ADAAA's
definition of major life activities incorporates activities that are
difficult to observe, such as concentrating, thinking, and
communicating. 34 Including activities like "communicating" can
generate more questions than answers regarding how broadly the
ADA should reach, as communication is immensely difficult to
understand, and occurs across a variety of cognitive, affective and
reflexive responses.35
The second indication that the ADAAA sweeps too broadly stems
from its inclusion of "the operation of a major bodily function" as a
major life activity. 36 Such broad inclusion extends ADA protection to
2 Id. at 1407 (footnotes omitted).
29 Amy L. Allbright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update,
31 MENTAL & PHYsIcAL DisABILTY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007). It should be noted that only 218
of those cases were resolved. Thus, 212 of the resolved cases were employer wins and only 6
were employee victories. Id.
3 Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
31 See JacksonLewis.com, President Bush Signs Landmark Amendments to the Americans
with Disabilities Act (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?
aid=1507.
32 See ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3556 ("An impairment that is episodic or in remission
is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active." (emphasis
added)).
3 See, e.g., Gary J. Oberstein & Jeffrey B. Gilbreth, Significant Changes to the Americans
with Disabilities Act - Many More Employees to Enjoy Protections, EMP. L. ALERT (Nixon
Peabody L.L.P., Boston, Mass.), Oct. 9, 2008, at 3, http://www.nixonpeabody.com/
linked medialpublications/ELA Alert_10_09_2008.pdf (predicting that employers will face
more requests for leaves of absence and other accommodations, as well as increased ADA
litigation and costs associated with litigation and settlement).
3 ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
35 See generally Leslie A. Baxter & Dawn 0. Braithwaite, Introduction: Meta-Theory and
Theory in Interpersonal Communication Research, in ENGAGING THEORIES IN INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICATION 1, 4 (2008) (Leslie A. Baxter & Dawn 0. Braithwaite eds., 2008).
36 ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555 (stating that "major bodily functions" include
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many employees whose impairments fall outside the spirit of the
statute.37 Under the 1990 ADA, an employee often could not establish
a claim based on something as serious as cancer, yet under the
ADAAA, the definition of a major life activity seems relatively
limitless. The third concern with the ADAAA stems from its
suggested construction of the substantially limits prong,39 which
attempts to dilute the language in favor of offering "broad coverage of
individuals under [the Act]."40 Expansion of the substantially limits
prong of the ADA was, presumably, one of the principal reasons
behind the push for amending the ADA. The drafters, however, failed
to alter the statutory language, placing the courts in the awkward
position of interpreting the same language differently.
While many areas of the ADAAA will generate fascinating debate
over the breadth of protection for the disabled, the purpose of this
Note is to explore the three changes highlighted above, and to
examine their anticipated effects on both employers and employees.
Part I briefly discusses the history of the ADA and the ADAAA, and
further elaborates on the evolution of the legislative purpose behind
the law. Part II explores three serious concerns with the ADAAA and
illustrates the likely outcomes for ADA plaintiffs and defendants
under the ADAAA. Finally, Part M proposes a moderate position that
seems to have been missed by the ADAAA-a position that would
better maintain the balance of protecting both disabled American
workers and the businesses that employ them.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE-THE EVOLUTION OF PROTECTION FOR
DISABLED WORKERS
In October 1987, Professor Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. drafted the first
version of the Americans with Disabilities Act while working as a
staff member at the National Council of the Handicapped. 4 1 After
extensive research on the pervasiveness of discrimination against the
disabled, the Council worked with a small committee to create a
functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, and digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine and reproductive functions). The list is
not exhaustive and allows recognition of other bodily systems, although one would have
difficulty articulating any bodily systems not accounted for within the statute.
37 For example, an employee could find herself with a viable ADA claim after being fired
because her menstrual cramps caused her to miss work a few times.
38 See Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996).
ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555-56.
4 Id. § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
41 Chai Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A View From the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 521, 523 (1991).
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model ADA bill,42 based in large measure on section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.43 Congress adopted the Rehabilitation Act
"to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment,
economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and
integration into society."44 However, the Rehabilitation Act applies
only to entities receiving federal funds;4 5 thus, a large number of
disabled Americans are left outside its protections.
Driven in part by the disability rights activist movement, 46 a
number of congressional members, including House Representative
Tony Coelho and Senator Tom Harkin, expressed interest in the
model ADA bill.47 Members of Congress studied the model bill and,
over the course of about six months from October 1987 to April 1988,
drafted the first ADA.48 Unfortunately, the 100th Congress ended and
the ADA died on the floor.49 During the first year of the next session,
Senators Harkin and the late Edward Kennedy devoted themselves to
writing a new version of the ADA and generating support for its
passage.50 After undergoing another period of refinement at the
request of the business community, a final version appeared in early
1990.11
Interestingly, support for the ADA was not primarily driven by
equitable social considerations.52 Although congressional leaders
recognized that disability discrimination created an unnecessary bar
to the disabled from fully participating in society, they also realized
that the country was spending billions of dollars a year on disabled
individuals' added dependency on the welfare rolls.5 As
Representative Coehlo noted, society as a whole "bears the economic
burdens of this prejudice: dependency is expensive. It increases
42 See id. at 523-24
43 See Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)).
4 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
45 Eichhom, supra note 27, at 1421.
46 See id. at 1421-23 (noting activists' significant lobbying efforts, shaping the passage of
the ADA).
47 See Melanie D. Winegar, Note, Big Talk, Broken Promises: How Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Failed Disabled Workers, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1267, 1281
(2006).
48 Feldblum, supra note 41, at 525.
4 Id. at 526.
5 Id.
51 Id. at 530.
52 See Winegar, supra note 47, at 1281 (noting legislators' concerns that individuals with
disabilities, precluded from working due to discrimination, were largely forced to remain on
welfare).
53 Id.
s4 See id. (noting Senator Harkin's observation that disability discrimination creates "an
unnecessary dependency costing taxpayers and private employers billions of dollars on an
annual basis" (quoting 134 CONG. REc. 9382 (statement of Sen. Harkin)).
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benefit entitlements and decreases productive capacity sorely needed
by the American economy."55 As a result of congressional "belief that
the [ADA] would substantially relieve [economic] dependency on the
government," the ADA passed with little opposition.56 The final bill
passed the House by a vote of 377-28, and the Senate by a vote of
91--6.57
The ADA as passed in 1990 purported to significantly extend the
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. 8 At the time of its passage,
lawmakers and disability advocates alike saw the ADA as a potent
mechanism for decisively eradicating disability discrimination, as
well as a way to transform employment law.59 Many hailed the ADA
as "the greatest single achievement of the disability rights movement
to date."60 President George H.W. Bush, upon signing the ADA into
law, stated that "every man, woman, and child with a disability can
now pass through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality,
independence, and freedom." 6 1
Given the long deliberation that went into crafting the ADA, one
might expect the specificity of the statutory language to supply
identifiable contours for judicial interpretation. Unfortunately,
language that many thought would provide broad protection for the
disabled62 has instead generated disappointment and confusion.63
From the outset, the business community had "a number of concerns
with the bill that they articulated in a series of Senate hearings on the
ADA."6 President George H.W. Bush addressed those concerns in
his signing statement, indicating that his "administration and the
United States Congress [had] carefully crafted [the] Act . .. to ensure
that it gives flexibility . . . and contain[s] the costs that may be
5s 134 CONG. REC. 9605 (1988) (statement of Rep. Coelho).
16 Winegar, supra note 47, at 1281.
57 Feldblum, supra note 41, at 531.
58 See Eichhorn, supra note 27, at 1421 (noting that although the ADA's "general
prohibitions echo the language of section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act], its provisions proceed
to map out relative rights and obligations with much greater specificity" (footnote omitted)).
5 See id. (noting that the ADA has been called a "second-generation" civil rights statute).
60 Id. at 1423 (quoting FRED PELKA, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 18 (1997)).
61 President George H.W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (July 26, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html
[hereinafter Bush Remarks].
62 See, e.g., NANCY L. EIESLAND, THE DISABLED GOD: TOWARD A LIBERATORY
THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY 19 (1994) (stating that the ADA represents an "emancipation
proclamation" for the disabled); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WfTH DISABILITIES
FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 140 (1993) (describing the ADA as "an
earthshaking event" for the disabled).
63 See Eichhom, supra note 27, at 1423 (noting that the language of the ADA "has
prevented it from fulfilling its purpose of allowing people with disabilities full participation in
society").
6 See Feldblum, supra note 41, at 527.
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incurred."65 Unfortunately, President Bush's reassurances have not
materialized. The disabled have not enjoyed wide protection; in fact,
one could accurately argue that the ADA provided barely any
protection for the disabled. Courts have consistently found that
individuals with severely debilitating conditions were not disabled for
the purposes of the ADA, directly undermining the Act's purpose.
In three noteworthy cases, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify
its interpretation of the ADA. All three cases solidified the Court's
restrictive approach to ADA claims. In Sutton v. United Air Lines,67
the Court held that two airline pilot applicants with severe myopia did
not fulfill the substantially limits prong of the ADA because their
condition could be fully corrected through mitigating measures.6 8 The
Court held that "[a] 'disability' exists only where an impairment
'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,'
'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures
were not taken." 6 9 The Court's stance regarding the substantially
limits prong dealt a blow to the disabled, many of whom had
significantly quelled their limitations through medication or other
mitigating measures. On the same day as it decided Sutton, the Court
held in both Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg70 and Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc.7 that mitigating factors played a crucial role in
the analysis of whether one's infirmities create a substantial limitation
to a major life activity.7 2 With its restrictive approach to the
substantially limits requirement of the ADA, the Court crafted an
enormous obstacle to recovery for disabled employees who could
mitigate their conditions.
The courts' approach to the ADA finally prompted congressional
action.73  In September 2006, Representatives F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr. and Steny Hoyer introduced the ADA Restoration
65 Bush Remarks, supra note 61.
66 For one particularly alarming decision, see Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F.
App'x 874 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that a mentally retarded applicant was not
substantially limited in the major life activities of learning or thinking, solely because he had
graduated from a special school for the mentally handicapped).
67 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
6 Id. at 482-83. The ADAAA legislatively overrules Sutton's consideration of mitigating
measures. See § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3554.
6 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
7o 527 U.S. 555 (1999), superseded by statute, ADAAA § 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
-' 527 U.S. 516 (1999), superseded by statute, ADAAA § 2(b)(2}-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
72 See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
73 See ADAAA § 2(a)(3), 122 Stat. at 3553 (noting in the findings that "while Congress
expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently with
how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, that expectation has not been fulfilled").
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Act, which was later renamed as the ADAAA.7 4 As Representative
George Miller noted on the House floor, "[i]n 2004, workers with
disabilities lost 97 percent of the employment cases that went to trial.
There has been no balance in the courts, putting [disabled] workers at
a distinct disadvantage."7 Congress appears to have witnessed a
phenomenon eloquently identified by Bradley Areheart-that the
prevailing Supreme Court interpretation of the ADA "forced people
with disabilities into a Goldilocks dilemma-they are either too
disabled or not disabled enough." 7 6 The trio of Supreme Court cases
noted above deftly exhibited the failure of the ADA to protect the
disabled, and Congress responded decisively. 1 In the House, the
ADAAA passed by an overwhelming margin, with 402 voting in
favor of passage and 17 voting against it.78 The Senate followed suit,
unanimously voting for its passage.
Although President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA into law
in the autumn of 2008, the question remains: Will the courts interpret
the new, theoretically more specific, language as Congress
anticipated? After all, in its original form, the ADA was expected to
result in enormous breakthroughs for the protection of the disabled,
and instead wound up hindering that protection. Admittedly, on its
face, the ADAAA appears to have addressed several of the issues that
plagued judicial interpretation of the ADA over the last two decades.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the broad protections incorporated
into the ADAAA may end up further frustrating disabled American
workers. Despite the long and intricate legislative history of both the
original ADA and the ADAAA, the amendment may result in
perverse results and an equally confused judiciary.
II. DEFINING DISABLED: PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW DEFINITIONAL
SCHEME
Even a cursory review of the relevant case law illustrates several
inherent problems with the ADA's original definition of disability.8 0
74 See Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just Right": The Entrenchment of the
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 181-82 (2008).
7 154 CONG. REC. H6058, H6062 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Miller).
76 Areheart, supra note 74, at 181.
7 Most notably, the ADAAA legislatively overrules major holdings in both Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), and Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). See § 2(b)(2)-(4), 122 Stat. at 3554.
78 See 154 CONG. REC. H8286, H8288 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Nadler).
7 See 154 CONG. REC. S8342, S8350 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of Sen.
Harkin).
8 See Guzmin-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2005)
(noting that the ADA fails to state whether coverage extends to those suffering from recurring
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Perhaps the most perplexing definitional deficiency stems from
Congress's failure to offer an illustrative list of the types of activities
that constitute major life activities under the ADA. Without a list or
concrete definition, the concept of major life activity creates such an
ambiguous test for disability that some have argued the vagueness of
the test itself has led to judicial hostility toward ADA claims." One
might expect that an ambiguous text would lead the courts toward a
closer examination of the legislative intent behind the ADA, which, in
turn, should point toward broader coverage of the disabled. Strangely,
this has not happened. Instead, the courts have strictly construed the
ADA's text, resulting in a body of law that frequently acts to prevent
coverage of the very class the statute was enacted to protect. 82
In addition, the courts have struggled with determining the scope
of substantial limitation. Rather than approaching the substantial
limitation prong as an individualized analysis, courts have taken a
restrictive approach, consistently holding that to be substantially
limited, a plaintiff must show he or she is severely restricted in a
major life activity. The Supreme Court, in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,8 solidified the restrictive
approach by creating a demanding standard, requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the alleged impairment "prevents or severely
restricts the individual . . . ."8 Coupled with the Sutton rule-that
mitigating factors must be considered in determining the severity of
one's limitation86-almost no impairment could create a substantial
limitation that would satisfy the requirements of the ADA.
In some ways, the ADAAA addresses these issues. 87 In others, the
amendment falls short. First, the statute retains the original definition
impairments, and describing the void of legislative guidance in determining whether or not any
particular impairment constitutes a disability); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105-06 (3d
Cir. 1996) (describing Congress's failure to define major life activities and pointing out that to
be substantially limited, one must demonstrate that he is significantly restricted).
81 See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1807, 1814-16 (2005) (noting that the nearly universal court
hostility to ADA claims has led to finger-pointing by disability advocates, the EEOC, and the
Department of Justice).
82 See, e.g., Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F. App'x 874, 874 (11th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam) (holding that a mentally retarded applicant was not covered by the ADA).
83 See Kelly, 94 F.3d at 106-07; Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th
Cir. 1996).
8 534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
8 Id. at 198.
6 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by stature,
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
87 For example, the ADAAA eliminates consideration of mitigating factors in determining
if a plaintiff is disabled (by overruling Sutton's controversial decision). See § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat.
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of disability, including the major life activity and substantially limits
language. Second, although the statute codifies a list of major life
activities, the list far exceeds reasonable boundaries by including a
new provision that defines nearly every known bodily function as a
major life activity.89 Third, the ADAAA legislatively overrules
Toyota's holding on substantial limitation, noting explicitly that the
statute should be construed "in favor of broad coverage." 90 The
statute, however, fails to create a new definition to replace the
language with which it disagrees, in effect asking the courts to
interpret the same language differently. The following sections
examine each of these issues in detail.
A. Defining Major Life Activities
One of the most widely criticized elements of the ADA is its
failure to adequately define what exactly qualifies as a disability.9'
Much of the confusion surrounds the term "major life activity," which
Congress failed to define for reasons that are unclear.92 Circuit courts
have since split on the kinds of activities they will accept as major life
activities.9 3 Although the EEOC has attempted to provide some
guidance,94 courts have instead followed a restrictive reading of the
statutory text, "significantly limiting the number of employees who
can seek the protection of the ADA." 95
at 3554. The amendment also explains that the strict approach applied to previous cases fell
outside the legislative intent of the Act, and insists that courts instead interpret the new language
broadly. See id. §2(b), 122 Stat. 3554.
88 See ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
89 See id.
9 Id.
91 See, e.g., Friedland, supra note 21, at 171-72. The original language, maintained in the
ADAAA, defines disability, with respect to an individual, as: "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." ADAAA §
4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
92 See Friedland, supra note 21, at 184.
9 Compare, e.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing "interacting with others" as a major life activity because it is "an essential, regular
function, like walking and breathing"), with Soileau v. Guilforde of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15
(1st Cir. 1997) (equating "interacting with others" with the "ability to get along with others,"
and refusing to recognize either as a major life activity).
9 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008) (providing a broad list of suggested major life
activities).
9 Bryan J. Warren, When Determining Whether an ADA Claimant Is Disable, the
Claimant's Impairment Must Be Considered in Light of Available Corrective Measures, and
Failure to Meet DOT Regulations Does Not Establish that the Claimant was Regarded as
Disabled: Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 38 DUQ. L. REv. 1143, 1166 (2000).
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Congress's failure to adequately define major life activity forced
the courts to interpret which types of activities most people would
consider important, or "major," in their daily lives. This, of course,
led precisely to the problem-what exactly does "major" mean?
"Major" as to whom? The disabled? Congress? The courts? The
common link among the few recognized major life activities is
difficult to spot. As noted by Lisa Eichhorn, breathing "is a
physiological function that is necessary to all life. Other [identified
major life activities, such as] seeing and hearing, are sensory
functions that are not quite so crucial to human existence. Still others,
walking, speaking, and erforming manual tasks, are physical acts of
a more abstract nature." 6 Faced with a dearth of legislative guidance,
the courts have spent nearly two decades arguing over whether or not
certain activities qualify as major life activities under the ADA.97
Although the Supreme Court could have provided guidance by
definitively stating which activities it considered major for the
purposes of the ADA, it instead instructed that only those activities
which are "of central importance to daily life" should qualify as major
life activities." Not surprisingly, the Court's nebulous guidance failed
to prevent a circuit split over which major life activities should fall
within ADA protection.
Recognizing the circuit split and an unresponsive Supreme Court,
Congress provided a list in the ADAAA to assist courts in interpreting
the kinds of activities the statute was intended to reach. According to
the ADAAA, "major life activities include, but are not limited to,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working."" The list includes many of the major life activities found
in the EEOC Compliance Manual,'" although the ADAAA adds
several activities which will likely lead to further interpretational
difficulties. Notably, Congress added the activities of eating, sleeping,
standing, lifting, bending, reading, concentrating, thinking, and
communicating. 01 While the major life activities of eating, sleeping,
standing, lifting and bending are unlikely to create much
96 Eichhom, supra note 27, at 1429.
9 See id. at 1428-30.
9 Toyota Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), superseded by statute,
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
9 ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
'See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) (2008) (providing a non-exhaustive list of major life activities,
including "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working").
1o1 ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
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interpretational difficulty for the courts, the same cannot be said for
concentrating, thinking, and communicating. "Concentrating" and
"thinking" each involve entirely inward-conducted activity, 10 2 and
"communicating" suffers from such overreaching that mere social
ineptitude could fall within its grasp.
It is not surprising that the courts have been hesitant to include
primarily inward-conducted activities, like concentrating and
thinking, within the scope of the ADA. Scholars studying societal
treatment of the disabled have identified two primary models for
thinking about a disability's effect on both the afflicted individual and
the community in which he lives. 103 The medical model of disability
categorizes people as either "disabled" or "non-disabled," and regards
the individual's physiological incapacity itself as the problem.104 The
medical model severs societal responsibility from the disabled
individual, instead celebrating those who, without help, "overcome"
their disabilities.105 In contrast, the social model of disability places
the disabled into a societal construct made up of prejudices and
assumptions about normality (and thus carries with it a degree of
social responsibility for the disabled). 16 The federal courts have fully
embraced the medical model, 10 7 which tends to support a more
restrictive, every-man-for-himself approach to disability rights than
does the social model. 0 8  Unless the prevailing judicial attitude
dramatically shifts under the ADAAA, legislative inclusion of
inward-directed activities, such as "concentrating" and "thinking,"
seems unlikely to result in any greater protection of the disabled."1 9
10 What I suggest by the phrase "inward-conducted activity" is an implicit recognition by
the courts that impairments should be objectively measurable to enjoy ADA protection. Of the
ADAAA's enumerated list of major life activities, only "learning," "thinking," and
"concentrating" occur almost entirely within one's mind, and all three can be difficult to
measure. Of these, the major life activity of "learning" can be distinguished from "thinking" and
"concentrating" because learning is far more measurable (unlike the abilities to concentrate or
think, which are difficult to measure because they can vary extensively from person to person
without necessarily imposing an impairment on that individual's ability to engage in that
activity).
103 For an excellent discussion of the medical and social models of disability, see MARY
JOHNSON, MAKE THEM Go AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE & THE CASE
AGAINST DIsABILYY RIGHTS (2003) and Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 621 (1999).
04 Areheart, supra note 74, at 186-87.
105 Id.
"Id. at 188.
17 Id. at 192.
1Id. at 192-94 (discussing how the prevailing medical model of disability creates
misperceptions and even a degree of hostility toward the disabled).
109 The judiciary's skepticism toward inward-directed activities seems likely to continue
unless the courts' perceptions of the disabled also dramatically shift toward the social model.
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Including "communicating" as a major life activity is subject to
similar, and potentially more difficult, interpretational pitfalls.
Presumably, Congress meant communication to cover nonverbal
communication, since it also included speaking as a separate major
life activity.o10 The term "communicating," however, is incredibly
complex, and encompasses verbal, nonverbal,"' and written
communication. Some scholars estimate that as much as ninety
percent of our communication occurs nonverbally,1 2 and many
individuals find themselves severely limited in one or more forms of
nonverbal communication.113 Many of these same individuals,
however, have little difficulty verbally communicating with others,
although they may, for example, stand a little too close, or frequently
interrupt others while speaking. 114 Yet, if an employer fires an
employee with a proxemics problem, perhaps because that
employee's issue disrupts other employees or makes clients nervous,
the employee might find himself with a viable ADA claim based on
what, in reality, amounts to mere social ineptitude.' '5 This example
demonstrates the inherent problem with overly broad classifications,
which provide protection to individuals who fall within the statutory
text while remaining outside the spirit of the statute. Such
over-inclusion can lead to frustration in the courts and inconsistent
application of the statute.116
The communication/social ineptitude dilemma leads to another
serious issue. Protecting an employee who suffers from social
n
0 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555.
"'The term "nonverbal communication," itself, is a bit of a misnomer. Nonverbal
behavior includes several subtleties of speech and vocal phenomena, which are auditory, but
more properly described as nonverbal. See ALBERT MEHRABIAN, NONVERBAL
COMMUNICATION 1 (1972). For the purposes of this illustration, however, such a precise
definition is unwarranted. Therefore, my discussion of nonverbal behavior extends only to
kinesic behavior (gestures, expressions, postures, positions and the like).
112JAMES W. NEULIEP, INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
287 (3d ed. 2006).
113See id. Nonverbal communication can be broken down into several subparts (for
example, proxemics-communication through the use of social and personal space). See MARK
L. KNAPP, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN HUMAN INTERACTION 3-5, 36 (1972).
114 Id.
115 Or perhaps a vast cultural difference. See Irenius Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Universals in Human
Expressive Behavior, in NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR: APPLICATIONS AND CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS
17, 17-30 (Aaron Wolfgang ed., 1979) (discussing the similarities and differences in
cross-cultural nonverbal behavior); see also MEHRABIAN, supra note 111, at 6-7 (discussing
several studies finding that people of different cultures have diverging expectations and
preferences for proxemic behavior).
116 As can under-inclusion, as demonstrated by the original ADA. See, e.g., Tracey L Levy,
Legal Obligations and Workplace Implications for Institutions of Higher Education
Accommodating Learning Disabled Students, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 85, 85-86 (2001) (discussing the
exponential increase in claims filed by learning-disabled students seeking accommodations
under the ADA).
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ineptitude may diminish the law's potency with respect to those
suffering from seriously debilitating communicative disorders, such
as stuttering or Down Syndrome (although this would largely be
covered by the ADAAA's new list of major bodily functions).117
There are social and economic problems associated with protecting
those who don't need protection. Socially, overbroad protection often
has a dilutive effect, and could potentially lead to excessive
litigation,' or worse, judicial hostility against the very class the
statute was enacted to protect.l 19 Over time, after a large number of
plaintiffs with questionable disabilities succeed in their claims, courts
may view with severe skepticism anyone claiming a disability under
the ADA, whether or not their disabilities fall within the spirit of the
statute.
Economically, employers may suffer serious harm, as they could
find themselves hamstrung in crafting a workforce. Employers
concerned about compliance with the ADAAA may run serious
financial risk by terminating employees who display virtually any
form of social ineptitude or awkwardness. Ironically, job applicants
with minor communicative abnormalities could face the perverse
effect of not being hired solely because an employer does not want to
risk subsequent litigation. Ultimately, the more money employers
must spend developing preventive measures, litigating, or settling
ADA claims from plaintiffs that were not intended to fall within the
statute's protections, the more difficulty applicants and employees
will have finding and retaining their jobs.
Despite these problems, it would be difficult to argue that the
ADAAA's inclusion of an illustrative list of major life activities is
entirely unhelpful. The greater cause for concern is the likely event of
one of the following outcomes: (1) the list will either generate
confusion as to which activities should enjoy protection, or (2) it will
result in such a broad inclusion that the courts will be unable to
identify anyone without a disability. The first concern-that the list
merely highlights the inherent deficiencies within the definition of
disability-seems the more likely result. Under the original ADA,
many courts concluded that "concentrating," to take an illustrative
example, did not constitute a major life activity.1 20 The courts
117 See infra Part II.B.
118 See Molly M. Joyce, Note, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Fallen on Deaf
Ears? A Post-Sutton Analysis of Mitigating Measures in the Seventh Circuit, 77 CHi.-KENT L.
REv. 1389, 1409 (2002) (noting the likelihood that overly broad protection under the ADA
would lead to excessive lawsuits against employers).
119 See Waterstone, supra note 81, at 1814-16.
12
oSee, e.g., Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1231
(10th Cir. 1999) (noting that "sleeping, although not enumerated in the regulations, constitutes a
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reasoned that concentrating "may be a significant and necessary
component of a major life activity, such as working, learning, or
speaking, but it is not an 'activity' itself."'21 Congress apparently did
not agree with this reasoning. If concentrating alone is considered a
major life activity, are employers expected to tolerate employees who
slack off, under the fear that the employee might file an ADA claim
as to a limitation in his ability to concentrate? Certainly there are
medical conditions that manifest themselves primarily in limiting a
person's ability to concentrate (and, presumably, these are the
conditions the ADAAA meant to reach), 12 2 but such conditions should
fall within one of the other major life activities under the ADAAA. 23
Therefore, including "concentrating" in the statutory list seems
redundant and confusing. Courts will likely face the problematic task
of distinguishing meritorious claims based on "concentrating" from
those claims where the plaintiff was simply lazy.12A
Another problem warrants brief mention. For nearly twenty years,
we have witnessed the problem of under-inclusion in the context of
the ADA. Under-inclusion tends to bar those who fall within the
spirit, but outside the text of the statute, from enforcing their federal
rights. Over-inclusion will have the opposite, although not necessarily
preferable, result-those who fall within the text, but not the spirit, of
the statute will be able to enforce federal rights they may not be
entitled to. The original ADA launched a massive number of
disability discrimination claims. 12 5 The ADAAA will likely have the
same effect, perhaps accentuated by the fact that so many more
employees will fall within the statute's text. While the "floodgates"
argument generally suffers from the fact that our court system is
designed to handle as many meritorious claims as necessary to protect
individual rights, Congress does a disservice to the system by
major life activity, while concentration does not").
121 Id. (quoting Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999)).
122 Such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). The National Institute of
Mental Health describes ADHD as a disorder where the sufferer has "difficulty staying focused
and paying attention," and "difficulty controlling behavior." See http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
health/publications/attention-deficit-hyperactivity-disorder/complete-index.shtml.
123 For example, neurological or brain functions. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat 3553, 3555.
124 Although the courts may not have much difficulty determining whether an employee
was lazy or actually suffered from a substantially limiting impairment, the point is that a lazy
employee should never find himself with a viable ADA claim. Yet, under the ADAAA, he
might.
125 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 116, at 85-86 (discussing the substantial increase in ADA
accommodations claims filed by learning-disabled students).
482 [Vol. 60:2
THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK
adopting overly broad statutes that permit coverage beyond the reach
of the statutory intent.
On the other hand, it is hard to fault Congress for failing to define
major life activity. The term is difficult to pin down, and given the
legislative intent of providing broader coverage for the disabled,
defining major life activity may have provided the courts with a new
excuse to limit the reach of the Act. Congress, however, should have
been more meticulous in its adoption of the illustrative examples. For
instance, rather than including "concentrating" and "thinking" as
major life activities, Congress should have made coverage of those
activities dependent upon a demonstration that the plaintiff suffers
from a limitation on a bodily function.126
As it is unlikely that Congress will revisit the ADAAA in the near
future, the burden of suppressing these concerns rests squarely on the
courts. When addressing ADA claims under the amendment, the
courts should remember that Congress intended broad coverage for
the disabled. Courts should apply a case-by-case analysis to each
plaintiff bringing an ADA claim, and consider the legislative intent
behind both the ADA and the ADAAA. Courts should approach new
ADA claims not with a strict or liberal view toward major life
activity, but rather a realistic, moderate appreciation of the aims of the
Act. In assessing whether or not a plaintiff is limited in a major life
activity, the courts ought not overlook the statute's proposed
flexibility. The ADAAA provides several avenues for supporting a
disability claim, so the courts should avoid assuming every activity
constitutes a major life activity for the purposes of ADA coverage.
B. Operation of Major Bodily Function as a Major Life Activity
After the absurdity of numerous court decisions holding
employees who suffered from serious medical conditions (such as
cancer, 12 7 mental retardation,128 ovarian cysts,129 and cerebral palsy 3)
126 For example, an employee with ADHD could almost certainly demonstrate a substantial
limitation in his neurological functioning, which would fall under the protection of the
amendment. See ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
127 See Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that
the plaintiff was not substantially limited in the major life activity of "working," even after the
plaintiff explained the medical treatments and complications she faced in fighting breast
cancer).
'See Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F. App'x 874, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (finding that even though the plaintiff was limited because of his mental retardation, he
failed to present a prima facie case of ADA discrimination).
129See Guzmin-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2005)
(finding that the symptoms of the employee's ovarian cysts--izziness and extreme pain-were
not sufficient to show that she was substantially limited in working).
'3See Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2006)
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were not substantially limited in any major life activity, 31 Congress
expanded the definition of major life activity to include major bodily
functions.132 As amended, the section declares that "a major life
activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function,
including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal
cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions."l33
In part, inclusion of bodily systems as major life activities likely
stemmed from the noteworthy case of Bragdon v. Abbott.'3 The case
involved a woman who was denied dental services because she
suffered from HIV. 1s In her suit, the plaintiff claimed that HIV
substantially limited the major life activity of reproduction.136 A
divided Supreme Court agreed,137 and laid the foundation for
protecting those who suffer from debilitating diseases under the
ADA. Although disability rights advocates lauded Bragdon's
outcome, many saw the decision as more of an anomaly than a
progressive step toward greater disability rights. 38
With its expansive approach to the ADAAA, Congress seems to
have recognized the impact of Bragdon and supported its
conclusion-diseases that create serious limitations on major life
activities should be covered by the ADA. While this recognition fits
within the overall concept of providing broad coverage for the
disabled,13 9 Congress may have overreached. Certain maladies, such
as cancer, HIV, and epilepsy, almost certainly fall within this section.
However, courts should be careful not to blindly find all people with a
particular disorder disabled for the purposes of the ADA. Perhaps
every sufferer of a very serious condition will meet the statutory
(finding a woman's limitations due to her cerebral palsy, including difficulty preparing,
chewing, and swallowing food, were too narrow and specific to show a substantial limitation in
caring for oneself).
131 In fact, HIV/AIDS may well be the only severe medical condition confirmed by the
(divided) Supreme Court to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity, and even
that decision fell short of declaring HIV/AIDS a per se disability under the ADA. See Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
13 2 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555
133 Id.
1- 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
'
3
1 See id. at 628-29.
6 Id. at 637.
13 7 See id. at 655.
138 See, e.g., Amy C. Reeder, Case Note, Bragdon v. Abbott: Is Asymptomatic HIV a Per
Se Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 50 MERCER L. REv. 631, 640 (1999)
("Bragdon is an anomaly among ADA cases with respect to the Court's methodology in
determining whether a plaintiff has a 'disability."').
'
39 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(a)(1), 2(b)(1), 122 Stat.
3553, 3553-54.
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definition, but the courts must continue to make individualized
findings as to the extent of the plaintiffs infirmity. 140 Such
individualized scrutiny is particularly important with moderate or
obscure conditions, such as celiac sprue, 14 1 a genetic disorder that
substantially limits the digestive and bowel functions of those
suffering from the disease. Under the ADAAA, an employee would
not need to demonstrate that he or she is substantially limited in the
major life activity of eating (something that would be very difficult
for a sufferer of celiac sprue), 14 2 but merely that celiac sprue
substantially limits his or her digestive or bowel functions. Although
celiac sprue certainly frustrates those afflicted with it, 14 3 many people
who suffer from the disease lead perfectly healthy, normal lives,
without the attendant disadvantages common to those with
disabilities. 1 " Courts must not, therefore, be lured into branding
particular diseases as per se disabling under the ADAAA, despite a
temptation to do so under the statute's broad inclusion of bodily
functions as major life activities.
While Congress prudently recognized the need to expand the ADA
to protect those with severe medical conditions, it also should have
emphasized the importance of examining the specific medical
condition at issue on a case-by-case basis. Some may argue that a
case-by-case analysis of ADA claims will result in inconsistent
application of the statute, but such a concern fails to recognize that an
individualized approach is both required by the language of the ADA,
and will offer better protection for the disabled. Maintaining an
individualized approach not only reflects Congress's intent in
'1The ADAAA retains the ADA's requirement that disability determinations must be
made with respect to the individual. ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
141 Celiac sprue, or celiac disease, is "a d[isease] occurring in children and adults
characterized by sensitivity to gluten, with chronic inflammation and atrophy of the mucosa of
the upper small intestine; manifestations include diarrhea, malabsorption, steatorrhea, nutritional
and vitamin deficiencies." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 553.
142 Those with celiac sprue are intolerant to gluten, and, while it is difficult for these people
to eat outside of the home, they can eat anything not made with wheat, oats, rye, barley or malt.
See http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000233.htm.
143 This author included.
1 The ADA cites data indicating that disabled individuals, "as a group, occupy an inferior
status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and
educationally." Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(6), 104
Stat. 328, 329 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2006)). While this statement is
undoubtedly true, sufferers of celiac sprue simply must maintain a particular diet; the distinction
is no different from one who suffers from a severe peanut allergy. Further, it should be noted
that celiacs' tolerances to gluten vary widely, from those with very mild symptoms to, in rare
circumstances, those who perish due to the disease. This variance offers additional support for
the necessity of a case-by-case analysis of each plaintiffs condition rather than broad
classifications.
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defining the scope of disability under the ADA, 14 5 but it remains the
only logical approach to determining whether or not a plaintiff falls
within the statutory protections. Not every individual afflicted with a
particular disease will manifest exactly the same limitations and
functional problems. 14 Therefore, an individualized approach is not
only logical but necessary to ensure fair application of the ADAAA's
broad statutory terms.
C. Goodbye Toyota Standard of Substantial Limitation
Among the stated purposes for the ADAAA, Congress "reject[ed]
the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams," 47 which held that the
definition of disability should be interpreted "strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." 48 Congress also
rejected the additional finding in Toyota that, in order to be
substantially limited, "an individual must have an impairment that
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that
are of central importance to most people's daily lives."1 4 9 The
ADAAA goes on to indicate that the courts have applied an
"inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage
under the ADA."150 For example, in Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,1st a man diagnosed with mental retardation was found not
substantially limited in the major life activities of learning, thinking,
communicating, social interaction, and working.1 12  The court
reasoned that because Littleton had earned a certificate of high school
special education and then attended a technical college where he
14s As indicated by the language of the statute: "[t]he term 'disability' means, with respect
to an individual." ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555 (emphasis added).
46 The question here is not which bodily functions are limited, but how limited those
functions become as a result of the particular disease or illness.
147 ADAAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554 (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams,
534 U.S. 182 (2002)) (emphasis added).
s
4 8 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.
149 ADAAA § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3554 (quoting Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198).
50 d. § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.
151 231 F. App'x 874 (11th Cir. 2007).
152Id. at 877-78. Finding Littleton not covered by the ADA for the major life activities of
social interaction and working is not surprising, as many courts have been hostile toward claims
of social interaction (or, as more commonly framed, "interacting with others"). See, e.g., Soileau
v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997). Working is difficult to establish under
both the ADA and the ADAAA, as plaintiffs must show that they are substantially limited in a
broad range of jobs, not just one particular job. As argued in Part II.A, supra, communicating
probably should not be maintained as a major life activity, as courts may have a difficult time
determining whether or not such an impairment is substantially limiting. However, the fact that
medically diagnosed mental retardation was found not to be substantially limiting to any of the
asserted major life activities, Littleton, 231 F. App'x at 877-78, particularly learning-the
hallmark of mental retardation-is quite startling.
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studied mechanical maintenance, he could not be substantially limited
in the major life activity of learning.153 The court's reasoning,
however, seems inherently flawed. The fact that Littleton could only
earn a certificate for high school studies and then was limited to
pursuing his studies at a technical college, is strong evidence of, not
against, a substantial limitation in the major life activity of learning.
Littleton's accomplishments should be commended (especially under
the medical model of disability), but to hold that Littleton was not
substantially limited because he was capable of learning something,
albeit at a severely disadvantaged level from the rest of the
population, demonstrates the courts' hostility to ADA claims.
Cases like Littleton proved to Congress that the courts were using
the substantially limits prong of the ADA too restrictively. In the
ADAAA, Congress specifically states that the definition of disability
should be construed "in favor of broad coverage."' 54 Although
Congress's recognition of the need to relax the standard was an
important step toward providing protection of the disabled, Congress
failed to alter the language of the ADA to reflect that change. Now,
under the ADAAA, the courts will be forced to approach the
substantially limits prong with very little guidance-and the minimal
guidance provided directly contradicts the language of the statute. On
the one hand, the ADAAA instructs the courts to construe the
language broadly.155 On the other hand, the language is exactly the
same as it was under the original ADA. As a result, Congress
essentially instructs the courts to interpret the same language
differently. Although this instruction should prevent a restrictive
approach to the statute, it provides no other guidance. Rather than
take the opportunity to tell the courts how to construe substantially
limits, Congress simply instructed the courts one way not to construe
the language.156 Thus, the ADAAA provides far less interpretational
guidance than would be expected for an amendment purporting to
clarify the meaning of its terms.
To clarify the scope of substantially limits, Congress could have
redefined the term to more aptly fit the statutory intent. Although
retaining the word "substantially" may prove to be of some benefit to
employers, 5 7 the contradiction between the word "substantial" and
153 Litleton, 231 F. App'x at 877.
5 ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
155 See id.
'
56 See id. § 2(b)(1)-(5), 122 Stat. at 3554 (rejecting previous Supreme Court
interpretations of the ADA's language, but declining to specifically create a more acceptable
construction).
'57 It is unclear if the decision to leave "substantially limits" as the applicable standard
occurred as a result of excessive pressure from business and industry leaders, but it is likely that
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the legislative directive to construe the term broadly render the phrase
ambiguous, if not meaningless. If Congress truly wished to relax the
applicable standard, it could have reflected this intention by changing
the language to, for example, "moderately limits," which seems closer
to the definitional scheme Congress intended. In addition,
"moderately limits" would better equip the courts to apply a
case-by-case analysis of each ADA claim, and to determine the extent
of the plaintiffs alleged disability. Maintaining the substantially
limits language could increase the likelihood that the courts will
relapse into their previous textualist approach to the statute, and
interpret the language restrictively. Altering the language to match its
intent, on the other hand, would have provided clearer guidance to the
courts, and resulted in an application more consistent with the intent
of the amendments.
III. THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK
While the courts' strict interpretation of the original ADA almost
completely barred the disabled from enjoying protection against
unlawful discrimination, the ADAAA seems poised to swing wildly
in the other direction. Congress appears to have drafted the ADAAA
out of reactionary panic rather than deliberative thought. Although the
ADAAA clears up some of the ambiguities of the ADA, it creates
many more. One of the brilliancies of our legal system, however, is
that the burden of interpretation falls to the courts. The judiciary's
interpretation of the ADAAA will determine just how far the
pendulum swings toward broad coverage of disabilities for ADA
claims. The courts should approach the ADAAA with a view toward
moderation and balance between protecting the legitimately disabled
from discriminatory employment practices and protecting employers
from those who fall outside the spirit of the ADAAA. The last
nineteen years have shown what can happen when an extreme
interpretation of mildly ambiguous statutory language is adopted-
those the statute was intended to protect were largely excluded.
Taking another extreme-protecting those who do not need it-will
certainly not result in any better application of the law. Instead, a
careful, moderate approach should be adopted.
business owners will be pleased by Congress's choice to retain the language. Employers may
find some small refuge in the substantially limits language of the ADAAA when defending
against ADA claims.
158For example, the ADAAA eliminates consideration of mitigating factors when
determining whether or not an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. Id. §
4(a), 122 Stat. at 3556.
[Vol. 60:2488
THE PENDULUM SWINGS BACK
The ADA was designed to protect the disabled from unlawful
discrimination.'" 9 At the same time, Congress consulted extensively
with the business community to determine whether or not employers
would be able to comply with the ADA. 16 0 Congress wanted to
establish a strong system of protection, but, in part due to resistance
from the business community, needed to craft a moderate approach
that required ADA plaintiffs to offer proof that they actually suffered
from a disability. While the exact definitional landscape of the term
"disability" has proven elusive, the ADAAA should be viewed as a
small step toward clarity. Still, because ambiguities remain, the courts
should remember the history that led to the passage of the ADAAA,
and resolve the remaining ambiguities in favor of a moderate
approach that provides comprehensive protection for those, and only
those, who need it.
Despite the ADAAA's shortcomings, disability advocates ought to
be excited about the statute. The amendments have the potential to
create long overdue protections for employees and applicants
suffering from disabilities. Some caution, however, is warranted.
Many of the statutorily adopted major life activities-such as
"thinking," "concentrating," and "communicating,"l16 1 --could create
protections beyond the limits Congress intended. Additionally,
including the normal operation of every bodily function as a major
life activityl62 could lead to protection of nearly everyone. Finally,
Congress generated further ambiguity by retaining the substantially
limits language with instructions telling the courts to interpret the
term more liberally.16 3 Congress could have avoided this ambiguity
simply by drafting new language that more accurately reflects the
statutory intent.
These potential problems may be averted by a thoughtful and
moderate application by the judiciary, especially in the first few ADA
cases it hears.'6 New precedent can be drawn, but unless the courts
159 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
Iso See Feldblum, supra note 41, at 530.
161 ADAAA § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555.
162 Id.
163 Id.
64 There is reason to be cautiously optimistic. At the time of this writing, only sixty-two
decisions cited the ADAAA. Of those, only one discussed fully the ADAAA's standard and its
potential application to the plaintiffs case, while the remainder merely held the ADAAA
inapplicable and moved on. The case that discussed the liberal standard of the ADAAA also
identified many of the potential problems discussed within this Note. See Rohr v. Salt River
Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009). It should be noted,
however, that although the Ninth Circuit did look to the ADAAA for guidance, it decided the
case under the original ADA, not the ADAAA. See id. at 853. Specifically, the court held that
the plaintiff, who suffered from Type H diabetes, could raise a genuine issue of whether he was
substantially limited in the major life activity of eating. Id. at 859. The court noted that diabetes
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are willing to approach the ADAAA from a dynamic, historical
perspective, a knee-jerk judicial reaction similar in scope (but
opposite in effect) to the last nineteen years could result. The original
ADA, though noble in intention, failed to deliver the protection it
promised. Armed with new legislation and a developed historical
perspective, however, the courts could finally have the tools
necessary to protect the disabled from employment discrimination.
PAUL R. KLEIN
constitutes a physical impairment for purposes of establishing a disability, "because it affects
the digestive, hemic and endocrine systems." Id. at 858. The court then analyzed the many
bodily effects of diabetes and patients' difficulties keeping them under control, ultimately
holding that diabetes could substantially limit an individual's major life activity of eating for
purposes of surviving summary judgment. Id. at 858--60.
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 2010.
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